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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 7 8 2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Ann. (1992 Supp.). See, State v. Humphrey,
823 P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether blood tests results made from a blood sample

acquired subsequent to an invalid arrest are admissible where the
appellant voluntarily consented to the blood sample and where the
appellant's consent was acquired independent of the invalid
arrest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

"Because of the trial court's advantageous position in

determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, that
determination should not be reversed unless it is clearly
erroneous." State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989)
(citing State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

Thus,

unless the trial court's ruling was clearly in error, the court's

decision to grant or deny the motion should be upheld. State v.
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 256 (Utah App. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee stipulates to the appellants statement of the case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about October 27, 1991, the Appellant, Troy N. Passey,

was traveling southbound on SR-215, south of 4400, when his truck
left the road and lodged in a culvert on the westside of the
roadway. (Tr. p. 6)
2.

Shortly after the accident, Officer David Popelmayer of the

Utah Highway Patrol arrived on the scene of the accident.

He

observed the appellant's car in the culvert, and damage to a
fence and sign that was caused by the car's path. (Tr. p. 7).
3.

Upon the arrival of Officer Popelmayer, the defendant was

being placed in ambulance.

As the defendant was being placed in

the ambulance, his identification was secured and he was
identified as the named appellant. (Tr. p. 10).
4.

Once the defendant was in the ambulance, Officer Popelmayer

approached the back of the ambulance.

While standing at the back

of the ambulance and at the feet of the appellant, Officer
Popelmayer could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage. (Tr. p.
11).
5.

Based on the odor of alcohol, discussions concerning the

accident from witnesses, and evidence from the accident scene,
2

Officer Popelmayer radioed Officer Hogan and requested
that he meet the appellant at the hospital and place him under
arrest for driving under the influence and witness the blood
draw. (Tr. p. 12).
6.

Upon arrival at LDS hospital, Officer Hogan located the

appellant, placed him under arrest, read him the admonition
concerning the consequences for refusing the comply with blood
sample and then waited with the appellant for the blood
technician to arrive to take the blood sample. (Tr. p. 18).
7.

After the blood technician arrived, Officer Hogan asked the

appellant for his consent to take a blood sample.
consented and a sample was taken.

The appellant

Officer Hogan witnessed the

blood draw and then read the appellant his Miranda rights. (Tr.
p. 23).
8.

On February 12, 1992, a suppression hearing was held.

The

hearing considered two motions submitted by the appellant.

The

first motion sought to suppress the blood test results based on a
lack of probable cause to arrest and the second motion was a
motion to dismiss. (Appellant's appendix 2).
9.

After hearing the arguments of counsel and considering the

authorities submitted, the court ruled that although there was
insufficient probable cause to arrest the appellant, because the
appellant voluntarily consented to the blood sample the blood
tests results were admissible. (Tr. pp. 38-39).
10.

Based on its findings, the court denied the appellant's

motions. (Tr. pp. 40-47).
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Evidence acquired subsequent to an invalid arrest is
admissible where the State can establish that the evidence was
seized pursuant to a voluntary consent and that the consent was
obtained independent of the invalid arrest.

In this case,

although the appellant's arrest was found to be invalid for a
lack of probable cause, because the appellant voluntarily
consented to the blood sample and the consent was obtained
independent of the arrest, the blood tests results are
admissible.

Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the

appellant's motions to suppress the results and dismiss the case
was not in error.

ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE
BLOOD SAMPLE AND THE CONSENT WAS ACQUIRED INDEPENDENT
OF THE INVALID ARREST, THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS ARE
ADMISSIBLE.
The appellant contends that because the arrest was invalid,
the blood test results should have been suppressed and the case
dismissed.

However, evidence acquired subsequent to invalid

arrest is nevertheless admissible where the State can prove that
the evidence was acquired by voluntary consent and that the
consent was obtained independent of the invalid arrest. State v.
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688-690 (Utah 1990).
Whether the consent was voluntarily depends on the "totality
of all the surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation." State v.
4

Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989)(citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973)).

Here# the trial court found

that the appellant's consent was voluntary because it was given
in the neutral environment of a hospital as opposed to a police
station, and because no threats accompanied the request for the
appellant's consent. (Tr. p. 39). Thus, because the trial court
considered the surrounding circumstances under which the
appellant's consent was made, the court's finding that the
consent was voluntary is not clearly erroneous.
Likewise, the appellant's consent was acquired independent
of the invalid arrest.

The test used to determine whether the

evidence was acquired independent of the prior illegality is
whether the acquisition of the evidence was "sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Arroyo, 796
P.2d at 690; (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, L.Ed. 441 (1963)).

In this case, the appellant was

already secured as a result of the injuries he suffered from the
accident when his consent to the blood sample was requested.

In

other words, the appellant's arrest was not a pretext to the
request for his consent.

This was noted by the court in its

findings that the appellant was not "going anywhere" when his
consent was requested. (Tr. p. 39). Thus, the request for the
appellant's consent to take a blood sample was independent from
in the invalid seizure.

5

CONCLUSION
Because the appellant voluntarily consented to the blood
sample and the consent was not acquired through the exploitation
of the invalid arrest, the blood tests results are admissible
despite the fact that the arrest was invalid for a lack of
probable cause. Accordingly, because the blood test results are
admissible the trial court's denial of the appellant's motions to
suppress the blood test results and to dismiss case was not
clearly erroneous.

For these reasons, this Court should affirm

the decision of the Third Circuit Court in denying the
defendant's motions.

__ /

October

RESPECTFULLY submitted this>*^^6^ay of Auguoto, 1992.

A>>XREENLIEF
Attorney for/Plaintiff/Appellee
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In Emery v. Emery* the California Supreme Court concluded that as between
California domiciliaries involved in an automobile accident in Idaho, the law of their
domicile should govern. The court's rationale was as follows:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family
relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the
state of the famfly domicile. That state
has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of
the family relationship and it is the only
state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect
a change in those incidents. Moreover, it
is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should
constantly change as members of the
family cross state boundaries during
temporary absences from their home.6
In Schwartz v. Schwartz,1 a case identical on its facts, a husband and wife, both
domiciliaries of New York, experienced an
automobile accident in Arizona. The wife
sued her husband in Arizona, Interspousal
tort suits were not permitted in Arizona,
but they were permitted in New York.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the
law of the domicile had application and
quoted with approval from Clark v. Clark8
as follows:
"[The] old rule is today almost completely discredited as an unvarying guide to
choice of law decision in all tort
cases
No conflict of laws authority
in America today agrees that the old rule
should be retained
No American
court which has felt free to re-examine
the matter thoroughly in the last decade
has chosen to retain the old rule.. ~ It
is true that some courts, even in recent
decisions, have retained^
But their
failure to reject it has resulted from an
5. 45 CaUd 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
6. Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.

STATE v, STRAIN

unwillingness to abandon established
precedent . . . not to any belief that the
old rule was a good one. [107 N.H. at
352,] 222 A.2d at 207 [citations omitted]/' 9
[1] We are persuaded by the rationale
of the Restatement rule, infra, and the
numerous jurisdictions which follow it We
therefore adopt the rule in Utah and reverse and remand with instructions to apply the law of the domicile on the issue of
interspousal immunity.
II
[2] The remaining issue is whether
plaintiffs action is barred for failure to
give timely notice of claim. We conclude
from the record before us that a genuine
issue of material fact remains to be resolved, namely, whether the State is estopped to assert the lack of timely notice of
claim.10 This is to be seen in that the trial
court specifically found that "there was
unrefuted testimony by affidavit that the
State of Utah denied through the Division
of Personnel Management that Defendant
Flinders was an employee of the State of
Utah." Hence, on remand, plaintiff should
be allowed to present evidence of her claim
of estoppel.11
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in part I but dissent from part
II of the majority opinion.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1986, Supp.
1988) requires that as a prerequisite to
suing a state employee for an act or omission occurring within the scope of his em10. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes summary judgment in the face
of a genuine issue as to any material fact

7. 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
8. 107 N.H. 351. 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
9. 103 Ariz, at 563, 447 P.2d at 255.

11. See Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah
2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).
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ployment, the plaintiff must, within one
year after the claim arises, file a notice of
claim with the attorney general and with
the agency employing the employee. No
attempt to comply with that statute was
made here by plaintiff. She seeks to excuse herself from that requirement based
on the affidavit of an investigator she hired
who stated that seven months after the
accident, he called the Division of Personnel Management of the State of Utah requesting confirmation of the state's employment of Ronald G. Flinders. He further stated that he was advised that no
individual with that name was employed by
the state according to its records. He apparently did not ask if there was such an
employee with that name at the time of the
accident
That denial of employment, however, is
entirely insufficient to support an estoppel
against the state and excuse plaintiff from
complying with the statute. This is because she had in her possession the accident report filed by the investigating police
officer that defendant Flinders was driving
a state-owned vehicle and that he was employed by a state agency whose address
was 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84119. She made no attempt to file a
claim with any state agency at that address
although there is a state office building
there housing at least two state agencies,
one of which is the Department of Public
Safety, which was and is Flinders' employer. There is in the record an affidavit of
an assistant in the personnel division of the
Department of Public Safety stating that
on the date of the accident, and at all times
thereafter, Flinders' name was on the list
of employees of that department, that any
person could have contacted that department and received verification of Flinders'
employment there, and that at all times
since the date of the accident the Departs
ment of Public Safety has been housed in a
building at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84119. In granting summary judgment in favor of Flinders, the
trial court expressly found that
[h]ad Plaintiff contacted the Personnel
Division of the Department of Public
Safety, she would have received verifica-

tion of Defendant Flinders' employment
status with that agency.
Not only did plaintiff fail to file a claim
with the Department of Public Safety, she
made no attempt whatever to file the claim
with the attorney general. No excuse is
offered for that omission except that plaintiff was not sure whether Flinders was a
state employee. That is entirely insufficient as an excuse.
Since plaintiff always had all the information needed to file a timely claim with
the Department of Public Safety andTwith
the attorney general, I cannot escape the
conclusion that as a matter of law, her
failure to do so was not the fault of Flinders or the Department which will work an
estoppel against them. Plaintiffs failure
stems solely from her own unwillingness to
make any effort to file based on information which she already possessed and which
was always accurate. When she chose not
to file, she assumed the risk of ignoring
information in her possession.
fO !KIY HUMIIIJY5TIM>
I f / * * ' ' * * * **

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Charles N. STRAIN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860531.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 5, 1989.
Defendant was convicted by jury in the
Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., of second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate CJ.,
held: (1) detective's Miranda warning that
defendant had right to have attorney appointed for him by court "at later date"
was not defective; (2) defendant knowingly

STATE v.. STRAIN
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and voluntarily waived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel before and during
interrogation; and (3) detective's threat of
first-degree murder charge against him
and possible execution if convicted and
"guarantee" that defendant would be
charged only with second-degree murder if
he admitted his involvement was improper,
and remand was warranted for determination of voluntariness of defendant's confession under totality of all the surrounding
circumstances.
Case remanded.
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed
opinion.
1. Criminal Law <s=>412.2(3)
Detective's Miranda warning was not
defective because it informed suspect that
he had right to have attorney appointed for
him by court "at a later date"; warning did
not imply that attorney would not be available for him at initial interview, and suspect had no Miranda right to immediate
appointment of counsel or warning to that
effect
2. Criminal Law <*=>412.2(5)
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights to remain silent and to
counsel before and during interrogation,
without any intimidation, coercion or deception on part of detective in that regard;
detective issued fresh warning before each
interrogation, and defendant's responses
thereto indicated his wish to speak. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
3. Criminal Law «=>520(2), 522(1)
Detective's threat of first-degree murder charge against defendant and possible
execution if convicted of homicide of his
step-daughter and his "guarantee"—wj?ich
could have been construed as offer of
promise of leniency—that defendant would
be charged with second-degree murder if
he admitted his involvement was improper,
and remand was warranted for evidentiary
hearing to determine voluntariness of defendant's confession under totality of all
the surrounding circumstances; while coercive threats and promises were made to

defendant, he also gave indications that
officers' improper statements did not induce him to confess. U.C.A. 1953, 76-5203.
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for defendant
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendant Charles Nicholas Strain appeals his jury conviction of second degree
murder, a first degree felony. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978, Supp.1988).
Defendant was arrested on February 20,
1986, in Scottsdale, Arizona, on a fugitive
warrant issued in the state of Idaho. Upon
arrest, Arizona detective Thomas Hill allegedly advised him of* his Miranda rights.
Four hours later, Detective Peter Bell of
the Utah County, Utah, Sheriffs office
questioned him about the shooting death of
defendant's sixteen-year-olcT stepdaughter,
Deanna, whose decomposed body had been
found some five years earlier in Spanish
Fork Canyon, Utah. Throughout this initial three-hour interview, defendant maintained his innocence with respect to that
death. The following morning, Detective
Bell resumed his questioning. This session
was followed by another interrogation that
evening by Detective Bell and also by Utah
County Deputy Sheriff Scott Carter. The
interrogation culminated in defendant's
signing a statement, admitting the killing.
He was subsequently charged with second
degree murder.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress his confession. The motion cited
inadequacies in the Miranda warning, as
well as threats and promises made to him
by Detective Bell which allegedly rendered
his confession involuntary. This motion
was granted by the trial court in view of
inadequacies which it found in the Miranda warning given by Detective Bell.
Subsequently, further evidence concerning
defendant's arrest was discovered which
prompted the trial court to reopen the hear-
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ing wherein Arizona Detective Hill testified
that he did recite the Miranda warning to
defendant upon his arrest on the Idaho
charges. In response, the trial court vacated its order suppressing defendant's statements. At trial, defendant again objected
to the admission of his confession into evidence on the grounds that the Miranda
warning given by Detective Hill was inadequate and that the confession was coerced.
The trial court overruled both objections
and admitted the confession. In so doing,
the court did not specifically address the
voluntariness challenge which focused on
the threats and promises made to defendant Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to a prison term of five years to life.
• I.

-

[1] Defendant maintains that the trial
court erred in failing to suppress his confession because the Miranda warning by
Detective Hill was defective. The Miranda warning originated out of the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct
1602, 16 LEd.2d 694 (1966). That case
outlined those basic rights of which the
accused must be adequately informed before any of his statements made to law
enforcement officers may be used as evidence against him.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct at 1630,
16L.Ed.2dat726.
While Miranda is recognized as obligating police to follow certain procedures in
their dealings with an accused, the decision
did not prescribe that law enforcement officers adhere to a verbatim recitation of the
words of the opinion. Miranda, however,
did hold that "in the absence of a fully

effective equivalent," statements made by
a defendant could not be used as evidence
against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86
S.Ct. at 1629,16 L.Ed.2d at 725. Since Miranda, the United States Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its intention of not extending the
"rigidity" of that case to "the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal
defendant" California v. Prysock, 453
U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct 2806, 2807, 2809, 69
L.Ed.2d 696, 701 (1981) (per curiam). With
this in mind, we examine the Miranda
warning given to defendant upon his arrest
Detective Hill testified at the reopened
pretrial hearing on defendant's motion for
suppression of his confession that he gave
defendant the following Miranda warning:
I said you have the right to remain silent,
anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have
the right to the presence of an attorney
to assist you prior to questioning to be
with you during questioning if you so
desire. If you cannot afford an attorney,
you have the right to have an attorney
appointed for you by the court at a later
date. Do you understand these rights?
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant argues that this warning implied that an attorney would not be available for him at the initial interview. He
asserts that a Miranda warning must inform the accused that an attorney will be
available immediately at the time of any
interrogation. These conclusions are unwarranted. While the warning did inform
defendant about the immediate unavailability of court-appointed counsel for him, we
do not believe it carried any implication
that he was required to submit to an interview with law enforcement officers without
the presence of appointed counsel if he
could not afford one. Furthermore, Miranda does not suggest that a suspect
must be told he has the right to the immediate appointment of counsel:
If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one
before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must
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have a "station house lawyer" present at
all times to advise prisoners. It does
mean, however, that if police propose to
interrogate a person they must make
known to him that he is entitled to a
lawyer and that if he cannot afford one,
a lawyer will be provided for him prior to
any interrogation.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct at 1628,
16 L.Ed.2d at 724; see also Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 409-10, 329 S.E.2d
815, 822-23, cert denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106
S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985).
Detective Hill's warning did not violate
these principles. Defendant was informed
of his right to counsel before and during
any police interrogation. He was also informed of his right to remain silent But
the immediate right to counsel which defendant envisions is not within the scope of
the Miranda decision. Once the accused
requests court-appointed counsel, it is
treated as a wish to remain silent, and the
police cannot proceed to interrogate him
until such counsel has been obtained or
until defendant initiates the interview.
One additional point is helpful. In California v. Prysock, instances were examined where courts have held particular Miranda warnings inadequate in advising the
accused of his right to court-appointed
counsel. It concluded that Miranda warnings which "linked" the right of appointed
counsel to some future point in time after
the police interrogation violated Miranda
principles. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360, 101
S.Ct at 2810. In some of these cases, the
right to appointed counsel had been linked
solely to appearances before the court, to
the time when charges were to be filed, or
to the time when the accused was transferred to another state. United States v.
Garcia, 431 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.1970) (per
curiam); People v. Bolinski, 260 Cal.
App.2d 705, 67 Cal.Rptr. 347 (1968);^see
also United States ex r*L Williams v.
Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1972).
It is clear that Detective Hill's Miranda
warning did not link defendant's right to
counsel to any future point in time after
police interrogation. The warning given by
Detective Hill was the fully functional

equivalent required by Miranda. Therefore, we hold that statements of defendant
are not inadmissible due to a violation of
Miranda.
II.
[2] Defendant next contends that he did
not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
privilege to remain silent and to have counsel before and during the interrogation.
Miranda warnings were intended to guard
against the inherently coercive nature of a
custodial police interrogation by fully informing the suspect of the state's intention
to use any self-incriminating statements to
secure his conviction. Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 420, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89
L.Ed.2d 410, 420 (1986). Once the accused
has been so advised, lie has the privilege of
waiving these rights but must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 475, 86 S.Ct at
1612, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707, 724. This is
generally acknowledged as meaning that
the waiver must have been the product of a
"free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception" and executed with "full awareness-both of the nature of the right being abandoned and [of]
the consequences of the decision to abandon
it" Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct at
1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421. Furthermore, this
determination requires an examination of
the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Fare v. Michael C,
442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct 2560, 2572, 61
L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979).
The record not only discloses defendant's
full awareness of the consequences of his
waiver but also the lack of intimidation,
coercion, or deception on the part of Detec. tive Bell in this regard. The following
portions of the interrogation demonstrate
this:
[Interview on the morning of February
27, 1986.]
Bell: Kind of like the rights, like I gave
you last night, you know you don't have
to, you don't have to say anything if you
want to.
Strain: Well, I understand that That's
not any problem. I just didn't know the
necessity of it

Bell: Um hum. Kind of still holds true
today, you know, when we're talking today the same thing goes as last night,
you don't have to talk if you don't want
to.
Strain: I've always known that But
sometimes all I do is make it worse and I
found that out a long time ago, when you
don't tell them what they want then they
think the worst and thaf s when you're
convicted of something you don't know
nothing about It happened to me twice
before.
[Interview on the evening of February
27, 1986.] •
Bell: (T]he number one thing I want to
make sure again is that you are very
well aware of your rights. You are going to hear them over and over again—I
told you last night and I told you this
morning.
Strain: That ain't going to make any
difference.
Bell: But you do have the right to remain silent
Strain: Hum um.
Bell: You don't have to answer any of
our questions if you don't want to.
Strain: I know this.
Bell: If you feel you need your attorney
present, the State of Arizona I'm sure
will be glad to appoint one for you.
Strain: Ya, but that would just tie you
up longer.
It is clear that defendant did voluntarily
and knowingly waive his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel before and
during the interrogation. The trial court
did not err in this respect by refusing to
suppress defendant's inculpatory statements.
III.
[3] Defendant next contends that the
trial court erred by failing to suppress his
confession because it was obtained through
coercion by Detective Bell. Such a claim, if
valid, would render the confession involuntary as being violative of defendant's fifth
and fourteenth amendment rights against
self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378

U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct 1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Specifically, defendant contends that Detective Bell threatened a first degree murder charge against him and possible execution, if convicted of that charge, if he did
not admit his involvement in the homicide
of his step-daughter. Set alongside this
threat was an alleged promise by Bell
which offered defendant the lesser charge
of second degree murder if he admitted
involvement in the murder. Detective Bell
denied making such a promise to defendant
Over the years, both federal and^ state
courts have struggled with the concept of
voluntariness and have employed several
formulations in their attempts to apply it
Several courts have stated that a confession of the accused must be the product or
result of a "free and unconstrained choice."
Other courts have defined the concept of
voluntariness by insisting that the confession be "freely self-determined," or the
product of "rational intellect and free will"
Another perspective frames the issue as
"whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed." See United States v. Gordon, 638 F.Supp. 1120,
1144 (W.D. La.1986), cert denied, 482 U.S.
908, 107 S.Ct 2488, 96 L.Ed.2d 380 (1987)
(citations omitted). As required in an examination of a waiver of Miranda rights,
the determination of voluntariness of confessions requires the court to consider "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226, 93 S.Ct 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854,
862 (1973); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d
1348 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d
233 (Utah 1985). The mere representation
to a defendant by officers that they will
make known to the prosecutor and to the
court that he cooperated with them, United
States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397 (4th Cir.
1985), or appeals to the defendant that full
cooperation would be his best course of
action, United States v. Pomares, 499 F.2d
1220, 1222 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S.
1032, 95 S.Ct 514, 42 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974),
have been recognized as not coercive.
However, as the State freely admits in the
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instant case, most courts have found a
confession involuntary where a threat to
pursue a higher charge if the accused did
not confess, or a promise to pursue a lesser
charge if he did confess, was exhortative.
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332,
1335-37 (9th Cir.1981); State v. Rhiner,
352 N.W.2d 258, 262-63 (Iowa 1984).
The record indicates that during the
course of the February 27, 1986 morning
interrogation, Detective Bsll made the following statement to defendant*
Now, what I'm trying to tell you right
now Charlie is, all you have to do, all
you've got to do ... the only thing that
is keeping you from going back to the
State of Utah and looking at a possible
execution on a first degree murder
charge or a second degree murder
charge, which is some jail time. The
only thing that keeps between them two,
is "yes, I did or no I didn't" Yes, second
degree murder, no, I didn't, f will prove
that you did and you are looking at a
possible execution date in the State of
Utah. That's all I want to hear from you
Charlie, all I want to hear is yes or no.
All I want to hear is, is there going to be
first degree murder or second degree
murder. I don't want to hear, "No I
didn't have nothing to do with it," because I can prove it and I'm going to
prove it I'll go back to the State of
Utah today, the County Attorney is going to file
Later, Detective Bell repeated this line of
interrogation.
Utah is, and Utah is going to bring you
back down. Charlie we're going to try
you for murder. So, just tell me right
now, lef s just (not understandable), yes
for jail time or no, are we going to go to
trial and for possible execution. That's
all I want to hear from you is just yes or
no.
^
Defendant immediately ^sked, "Just that
simple?" Upon this response, Detective
Bell then framed his dichotomous proposal
into what easily would have been taken as
an offer of a promise of leniency:
Just that simple. And I can guarantee
it Charlie, I can guarantee its that

simple. My God, this thing has been
drug on for five years. The little girl's
body up in the canyon, the soul was
crying for justice.
(Emphasis added.)
Not only did Detective Bell threaten a
first degree murder charge and possible
execution if convicted, we believe that he
also crossed the line when he offered defendant a promise as evidenced by his personal guarantee. The detective's offer was
framed strictly in terms which offered defendant a second degree murder charge
and jail time for his "yes, I did." Adding
to his proposal the dimension of leniency,
Bell informed defendant of the potential
first degree murder charge against him
and possible execution upon conviction if he
refused his guaranteed offer.
Upon Bell's extension of this promise of
leniency, defendant attempted to relate his
philosophy of life but was interrupted by
Detective Bell: "I don't want to hear it
Charlie. All I want to hear is yes or no."
After a few sympathetic comments by Detective Bell concerning defendant's hard
life, Bell continued to press:
Well, you are [trying to snow the law
enforcement] by not telling me yes or no,
because I know, Charlie, I know. Okay,
I'm just going to tell you right out flat, I
know. And all I have to do is prove it to
twelve jurors in the State of Utah. All
you have to do is just make an affirmative that, yes, you know too, or no, you
don't know and we'll have a trial. That's
all I'm asking for.
Soon after this statement, Detective Bell
offered defendant a moment to think.
Then after one final push by Bell, defendant began to admit his involvement in the
murder which eventually resulted in a
signed statement that evening admitting
culpability for the killing.
It is clear that the statements made by
Detective Bell to defendant were impermissibly coercive because they carried a threat
of greater punishment or a promise for
lesser punishment depending on whether
he confessed. The State, however, urges
us to affirm the admission of the confession because looking at the "totality of all
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the surrounding circumstances," the improper statements of Detective Bell did not
induce defendant to confess. The State
points out that defendant was an adult in
his forties and familiar with the criminal
"justice system. Certain statements made
by defendant in the course of the interrogation indicated that he little cared whether
he lived or died. He stated that he had "no
life left"; that he did not care if he were
executed; and that he cared only about the
persons he would leave behind.
While in Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897),
the statement was made that any threat or
promise, however slight, renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible, later
cases do not repeat that rigid rule but
follow the totality of all the circumstances
test In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 90 S.Ct 1463, 25 LEd.2d 747 (1970),
the Court found that a guilty plea made by
an accused was not rendered invo/untary
by the sole fact that the statute under
which he was charged permitted imposition
of the death sentence only upon a jury's
recommendation and thereby made the risk
of death the price of a jury trial. This
death penalty provision had earlier been
held to be unconstitutional in United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct
1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), because it imposed an impermissible burden upon the
exercise of a constitutional right Notwithstanding the coercive effect of the statute
in effect at the time the defendant in Brady entered his guilty plea, the Court, in a
later proceeding brought by Brady to set
aside his guilty plea, looked at all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea and found that there were
other valid considerations which prompted
its making, viz., a co-defendant had given a
confession, decided to plead guilty, and became available to testify against Brady.
See also People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704,
365 N.W.2d 648 (1984), where the Supreme
Court of Michigan rejected the strict per se
test sometimes attributed to Bram v. United States, and adopted "the simple rule
that a confession caused by a promise of
leniency is involuntary and inadmissible."
(Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, the trial court did not
address defendant's contention that even
though an adequate Miranda warning had
been given to him, his subsequent confession was the result of coercive threats and
promises made by the interrogating officers. We therefore do not have before us
an adequate record upon which we can
determine the question of voluntariness.
There is no testimony of defendant as to
what considerations prompted his confession! As earlier stated, while coercive
threats and promises were made to him, he
also made statements which indicate that
the improper statements of the officers did
not induce him to confess.
We therefore remand this case to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing to
determine the voluntariness of defendant's
confession under a "totality of all the surrounding circumstances." If the confession 23 /WMW3 to have been wJuotarDy given, the conviction is affirmed. However, if
the confession is found to have been involuntarily made, a new trial should follow.
HALL, C J., and STEWART and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring):
I join in the majority opinion. However,
in the absence of some statement as to how
We view the record before us, our remand
for a determination of the question of voluntariness raises the possibility of an
avoidable additional appeal and remand.
As the majority notes, the detective's comments were plainly outside the bounds of
permissible interrogation and were, on
their face, coercive. Moreover, the transcripts demonstrate that defendant's con. fession was made immediately after these
coercive statements. For the benefit of the
trial court and the parties, I think we
should indicate that while the State has
contended that "it may be possible ... to
find . . . that Bell's improper statements
did not actually induce defendant to confess" (emphasis added), if such a finding
Were based on nothing more than the evidence presented to us at this point, there
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would be some doubt as to such a finding's
sustainability.

William ANDREWS, Petitioner,
v.
Eldon BARNES, as Warden of the
Utah State Prison, Respondent
No. 890359.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 18, 1989.
Certiorari Denied Oct 30, 1989.
See 110 S.Ct 354.
Prisoner brought habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court held that (1)
state's exercise of peremptory challenge to
excuse prospective black juror was not
based on juror's race, and (2) any error in
testimony of witness during penalty phase
of trial was harmless.
Petition denied.
Durham and Zimmerman, JJ., dissented in part
1. Habeas Corpus «=>898(3)
Good cause existed for addressing issue of whether state exercised peremptory
challenge against juror on the basis of the
juror's race, even though there had been
previous petitions for writs of habeas corpus, where issue did not arise until testimony given by judge before Board of Pardons.
2. Jury «=»120
State's exercise of peremptory Challenge against black juror ^ a s not based on
juror's race; prospective juror was law enforcement officer who stated that he believed that persons charged with crimes he
investigated were guilty, that he believed
his fellow officers believed the same, and
some of his fellow officers were scheduled
to appear as witnesses.

3. Criminal Law «=»1177
Any error in testimony of witness at
penalty phase of trial, that three persons
who had been convicted of first-degree
murder and subsequently released from
state prison had again committed murder
was insufficient to have played any role in
jury's determination of penalty, and was
harmless.
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, Wash., Gordon
G. Greiner, Mary V. Stolcis, Sandra Goldman, Patricia A. Rooney, Denver, Colo.,
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner.
Robert R. Wallace^TJ. Tsakalos, Daniel
S. McConkie, Salt Lake City, for respondent
PER CURIAM:
[1] This case is here as a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. As a result of the
testimony given by Judge Robert Newey,
who had been the prosecutor in the trial of
William Andrews, the question has been
raised in this petition whether the State
exercised one of its peremptory challenges
against a juror in the trial of this matter on
the basis of the juror's race. Since the
issue did not arise until the testimony given
by Judge Newey before the Board of Pardons, there is good cause under rule
65B(iX4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which warrants addressing the issue on its
merits even though there have been previous petitions for writs of habeas corpus
filed in this Court Hurst v. Cooky 777
P.2d 1029 (1989).
[2] Although a superficial reading of
Judge Newey*s testimony before the Board
of Pardons might lead one to conclude that
the exercise of the peremptory challenge
was based on race, the trial transcript of
the actual voir dire examination casts the
matter in a different light The putative
juror, a law enforcement officer who exhibited commendable forthrightness, stated
that he believed that those persons who
had been charged with crimes as a result of
his investigations were in fact guilty. He
also stated that he believed that his fellow

officers on the Ogden police force believed jury's determination of the appropriate penthe same. It is clear from the transcript of alty under the circumstances.
the voir dire questioning, that some of
Justices DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN
those officers were scheduled to appear as dissent with respect to the Court's ruling
witnesses in the trial of this matter. Coun- on the striking of juror James H. Gillespie
sel for co-defendant Dale Selby Pierre from the jury panel. They would issue a
moved to remove the juror, James H. Gil- stay of execution of sentence and refer the
lespie, Jr., for cause. That motion was peremptory challenge issue to the district
expressly joined by counsel for William An- court for an evidentiary hearing before addrews. The trial judge denied the motion. dressing the merits of the petition. They
Mr. Newey then indicated a willingness to view the prosecutor's statement before the
agree to the striking of Mr. Gillespie so Board of Pardons as raising a factual issue
that no peremptory challenges would have about the basis for the decision of the
to be used by defendants to remove him. peremptory challenge.
The trial court indicated a willingness to do
The petition for habeas corpus is denied.
so if all the parties would stipulate to the
removal of Mr. Gillespie. Counsel for
Keith Roberts, another co-defendant, howIBf ft SYSTIM >
ever, refused. As a result Mr. Gillespie
was passed for cause.
Based on this portion of the transcript, it
appears that the State's reason for being
willing to stipulate to the removal of Mr.
William ANDREWS, Petitioner,
Gillespie and later for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge to strike him from
v.
the venire was to protect against possible
Pete HAUN, as Chairman of the Utah
error and a subsequent appeal that might
Board of Pardons; Victoria Palacios
be based on that issue. In all events, the
and Ed Kimball, as members of the
record is undisputed that counsel for WilUtah Board of Pardons; the Utah
liam Andrews clearly agreed to the removBoard of Pardons; and Eldon Barnes,
al of Mr. Gillespie after the motion to
as Warden of the Utah State Prison,
strike for cause was denied. Having twice
Respondents.
sought to remove Mr. Gillespie from the
No. 890360.
jury panel, William Andrews cannot now
claim that he was somehow prejudiced by
Supreme Court of Utah.
the State's removal of Mr. Gillespie. For
Aug. 18, 1989.
these reasons, we do not believe that petitioner's constitutional rights were in any
Original Proceeding in this Court
way prejudiced.
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, Wash., Gordon
[3] Petitioner also asserts that error
G. Greiner, Mary V. Stolcis, Sandra Goldwas committed in the penalty phase of the
man, Patricia A. Rooney, Denver, Colo.,
trial by virtue of the fact that a witness
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
testified that three persons who had been
' petitioner.
convicted of first degree murder and subseRobert R. Wallace, TJ. Tsakalos, Daniel
quently released from the state prison had
again committed murder. Petitioner as- S. McConkie, Salt Lake City, for responserts that the testimony was inaccurate in dents.
that only one of those persons can be
PER CURIAM:
shown to have committed murder. Even if
petitioner's allegation is accurate, we do
This case is here as a petition for exnot believe that the error was sufficient to traordinary relief. It appears from the inhave played any role whatsoever in the complete submission of the parties, both

684 UtPh

796 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

STATE v. ARROYO

Utah

685

Cite as 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)

scope of our capacity to order her removal
pursuant to either of those provisions.
The motion for summary disposition is
granted, and the petition to remove is dismissed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
£ MY NUH_B»S1fSTtM/

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jose Francisco ARROYO, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 890128.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 28, 1990.
Defendant in a drug prosecution
moved to suppress cocaine seized from his
automobile. The Court of Appeals, 770
P.2d 153, reversed the grant of defendant's
motion to suppress, and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) the prosecutor's
assertion that the search was consensual
was not evidence and could not support a
finding of consent, and (2) the officer's stop
of defendant for following too closely was
a pretext to search for drugs.
Court of Appeals' decision reversed
and remanded.
Hall, C.J., concurred in the result.
1. Criminal Law <S=>1158(1)
Standard of review for trial court's
finding of fact is that finding should not be
set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).

2. Criminal Law <s=1158(l)
Finding of fact made by trial -court
must be rejected if it is not supported by
substantial, competent evidence.- Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
3. Criminal Law <s=>1181.5(7)
Searches and Seizures <s=>197
Prosecutor's affirmative response to
judge's question of whether search was
consensual was not evidence, and could not
support finding of consent; thus, case was
required to be remanded for evidentiary
hearing on issue of consent. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures ®=192
Burden of establishing existence of exception to search warrant requirement is
on prosecution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Searches and Seizures <3=»180
To establish consent exception to
search warrant requirement, State must
demonstrate that consent was voluntary.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures o=a194
When prosecution" attempts to prove
voluntary consent after illegal police action
(e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), prosecution
has much heavier burden to satisfy than
when proving consent to search which does
not follow police misconduct. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
7. Automobiles <s=349.5(3)
State trooper's stop of defendant's
automobile for following too closely was
pretext to search for drugs; under totality
of circumstances, reasonable officer would
not have stopped defendant and cited him
for following too closely except for some
unarticulated suspicion of more serious
criminal activity. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
8. Searches and Seizures «=>182
In determining whether consent to
search is lawfully obtained following initial
police misconduct, inquiry should focus on
whether consent was voluntary and whether consent was obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.

9. Criminal Law <3=>394.4(1)
Exclusionary rule protects not only
those accused of crime but also those
whose only "crime" may be fitting "profile" which police use to determine whom
to search.
10. Searches and Seizures <s=»186
Search supported by voluntary consent
which is not exploitation of primary police
illegality may still be found invalid if
search exceeds scope of consent.. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
Walter F. Bugden, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent
STEWART, Justice:
This case is here on a writ of certiorari to
review a decision of the court of appeals.
The case presents important issues concerning the effect of consent searches and
pretextual traffic stops under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Mangelson asked Arroyo's consent to
search the truck, and Arroyo agreed.1 The
search uncovered approximately one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger-side
door panel of the pickup. Arroyo was arrested and charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1986).
Arroyo moved to suppress the evidence
on the ground that the traffic stop was a
pretext for searching the truck for evidence of a more serious crime. ' The trial
court found that the testimony at the suppression hearing "established the probability that no [traffic] violation occurred, and
that the alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the trooper to justify his
stop of a vehicle with out-of-state license
plates and with occupants of Latin origin."
The trial court also ruled that the "[defendant consented to the search of the vehicle." Nevertheless, the court granted
Arroyo's motion and ordered suppression
of the evidence. The State filed an interlocutory appeal in the court of appeals challenging the suppression order.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AND THE SUPPRESSION
HEARING

I. FACTS
On September 15, 1987, at about 4 p.m.,
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving southbound on Interstate 15 near Nephi, Utah. Mangelson had
completed his shift an hour earlier and was
driving home when he observed a northbound pickup-camper on the opposite side
of the freeway. Mangelson made a U-turn
through the freeway's median strip and
quickly caught up with the pickup which
was the last vehicle in a group of two or
three cars. Mangelson followed the pickup
and then pulled beside it to observe its
occupants and gauge its speed. The pickup's two occupants were both Hispanic,
and the truck had out-of-state license
plates. Mangelson stopped the pickup and
cited Arroyo, the driver, for following too
close and driving with an expired license.

The court of appeals held that the traffic
stop was "an unconstitutional pretext."
State v, Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). The court stated, "We are
persuaded that a reasonable officer would
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for
'following too closely' except for some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 770 P.2d at 155.
In addressing the issue of consent raised
by the prosecution, the court of appeals
found that defense counsel had blocked the
prosecution's efforts to establish that Arroyo had consented to the search and had
"[misled] the State and the [trial] court by
stipulating that consent was given," thereby preventing the prosecution from exploring the voluntariness of the consent. The

1. The defendant admits in his brief the facts
stated in the text, but does not admit that the

"consent" given by the defendant was "voluntary" under the appropriate legal standard.
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court of appeals concluded that Arroyo had
consented to the search and that the "consent" was "voluntary" and reversed the
trial court's suppression order. 770 P.2d at
156.
Two paragraphs of the court of appeals'
opinion are the crux of its resolution of this
case:
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not
contest the State's argument at the suppression hearing that he voluntarily consented to the search of his truck. Arroyo, through his counsel[,] stipulated
that he consented to the search. Arroyo's counsel objected when the State
attempted to offer evidence to establish
Arroyo's consent was voluntary, claiming
it was not relevant as the only issue was
whether the original stop was a pretext.
As a result, the trial court limited testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding Arroyo's consent. The trial
judge specifically found that Arroyo consented to the search of his truck, and
there is nothing in the record to contradict this finding.
For the first time on appeal, counsel
now argues that Arroyo's consent was
not voluntary as there was no "break in
the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence thereby obtained."
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448,
1458 (10th Cir.1985). However, this ar. gument should have been made below.
A defendant cannot mislead the State
and the court by stipulating that consent
was given, thus preventing the State
from exploring the circumstances of the
consent, and then argue for the first time
on appeal that the consent given was not
voluntary. Based on these circumstances, we conclude that defendant's
stipulation included that the consent was
given voluntarily.
770 P.2d at 156.
The court of appeals misconstrued the
record. The only time consent was mentioned at the suppression hearing occurred
during the testimony of Trooper Mangelson:

Q, [by the prosecutor, Mr. Eyre]: Upon
the vehicle stopping, what did you immediately do then?
A. I approached the vehicle. I asked
for a driver's license. I made as many
observations about the vehicle as I
could.
Q. Describe what you observed.
A. I observed—
MR. BUGDEN [defense counsel]:
Your Honor, for the record I think I
would object to any further inquiry at
this point. My motion only goes to the
propriety and the lawfulness of the
stop. And I think if that is what—
THE COURT: Was this a consent
search?
*
MR. EYRE: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: I think that is true,
Counsel. It goes strictly to the stop.
MR. EYRE: Okay.
Q. Anything ejse about the stop that
you recall that you have not previously
testified to?
A. I don't believe so.
The court of appeals'"opinion states, "Arroyo's counsel objected when the State attempted to offer evidence to establish Arroyo's consent was voluntary
" .770
P.2d at 156. The transcript of the suppression hearing reveals that prior to the objection by Arroyo's counsel, no mention had
been made of consent and that the objection was made to a question concerning
what observations Trooper Mangelson
made as he approached Arroyo's vehicle.
Defense counsel did not utter a word about
voluntary consent during the course of the
proceedings. Furthermore, as the court of
appeals' opinion correctly states, it was the
trial judge, not defense counsel, who "limited testimony concerning the circumstances
surrounding" the issue of consent. 770
P.2d at 156.
[1,2] The court of appeals stated that
the trial court found that "Arroyo consented to the search of the truck, and there is
nothing in the record to contradict this
finding." 770 P.2d at 156. Finding No. 18
in the trial court's findings and conclusions
does state, "The Trooper requested permission to search the Defendant's vehicle, and
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the Defendant consented to the search of
the vehicle." However, the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of review
in evaluating this finding. The standard of
review for a trial court's finding of fact is
that a finding shall not be set aside unless
it is clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P.
52(a); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2573, at
689 (1971); see also State v. Maurer, 770
P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1989). A finding not
supported by substantial, competent evidence must be rejected. 50 W. Broadway
Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d
1162, 1171 (Utah 1989).
[3] The only "evidence" anywhere in
this record which supports the finding of
consent is the prosecutor's response to the
judge's question about consent.2 However,
a prosecutor's assertion that consent was
given is not evidence and cannot support a
finding of consent. See, e.g., Stading v.
Equilease Corp., 471 So.2d 1379, 1379 (Fla.
Dist.CtApp.1985); Leon Shaffer Golnick
Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 1015,
1017 (Fla.DistCtApp.1982) ("[Attorneys']
unsworn statements do not establish facts
in the absence of stipulation. Trial judges
cannot rely upon these unsworn statements
as the basis for making factual determinations
"); see also Caperon v. Tuttle,
100 Utah 476, 484, 116 P.2d 402, 405-06
(1941); see generally 88 CJ.S. Trial
§ 181a, at 355 (1955). It follows that the
trial court's finding of consent is clearly
erroneous. The court of appeals' conclusion about consent is also erroneous.
In short, the record simply does not support the court of appeals' conclusion about
the issue of consent The record contains
no suggestion that defense counsel "[misled] the State and the court" on the issue
of consent and the record reveals no evidence concerning consent and no stipulation regarding consent Consent should
have been explored _at the suppression
hearing, but it was the trial court, not
defense counsel, who preempted the prose2. The court of appeals' opinion asserts that defense counsel stipulated "that consent was given." 770 P.2d at 156. However, no stipulation

cution's efforts to reach the issue. Therefore, the court of appeals was wrong in
reversing the trial court's suppression order. Instead, the case should be remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
consent.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED
IN
A
CONSENT
SEARCH FOLLOWING POLICE ILLEGALITY
Since this case must be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing, it is appropriate to define the parameters of the consent issue
which should be explored by the trial -eourt.
See, e.g., State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d'1368,
1370 (Utah 1986); Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah
2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974).
A. Exceptions to Warrant Requirement
[4,5] Searches conducted "outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct
507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (citations
omitted); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175
(Utah 1983). The burden of establishing
the existence of one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement is on the prosecution. Harris, 671 P.2d at 178. To establish the consent exception, the state must
demonstrate that the consent was voluntary. United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d
1141, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479
U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct 315, 93 L.Ed.2d 289
(1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375,
1377 (Utah 1986); State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).
B. Validity of Consent Following A Police Illegality
[6,7] When the prosecution attempts to
prove voluntary consent after an illegal
police action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop),
the prosecution "has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent
on any issue by defense counsel appears anywhere in the record of this case.
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to search" which does not follow police
misconduct. United States v. MelendezGonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984)
(citing United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d
913, 916 (5th Cir.1978)). In this case, a law
enforcement officer precipitated events
which led to the search of Arroyo's vehicle.
The trial court found that Trooper Mangelson's stop was not a lawful traffic stop but
rather a pretext to allow Mangelson to
investigate the car and its occupants. The
court of appeals agreed, stating that under
the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable officer would not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for 'following too closely' except for some unarticulated suspicion
of more serious criminal activity." 770
P.2d at 155. The trial court and the court
of appeals were clearly correct on this issue—Trooper Mangelson's stop was an unconstitutional pretext.3
In cases involving the admissibility of
evidence obtained as a consequence of police misconduct, the United States Supreme
Court has eschewed a "but for" test Under such a test, all evidence that would not
have been discovered but for the initial
police misconduct would be suppressed. In
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88, 83 S.Ct 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963), the Supreme Court expressly declined to hold "that all evidence is 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' simply because it would
not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police." See also Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 99 S.Ct
3. The following findings of fact justify the conclusion that the stop was a pretext:
8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the
time he requested permission%to search the
vehicle.
X
14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper
denied that it was his normal procedure when
issuing a citation to an individual for "Following too Close" to record the license plate of
the front car. However, the Trooper's denial
on this point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. The Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the

2248, 2259, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct* 2254,
2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Justice Powell
has stated that the Court's rejection of a
"but for" test in Wong Sun "recognizes
that in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than
can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes." Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 95
S.Ct. at 2264 (Powell, J., concurring in
part). Therefore, under certain circumstances, evidence obtained after police misconduct may be admissible.
[8] Two factors determine whether consent to a search' is lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct The inquiry
should focus on whether the consent was
voluntary and whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality. Evidence obtained in searches
following police illegality must meet both
tests to be admissible. 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d
ed.1987).
1. Voluntary consent
The case law holds that a consent which
is not voluntarily given is invalid. See, e.g.,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
233, 93 S.Ct 2041, 2050, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d
1141, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479
U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 315, 93 L.Ed.2d 289
(1986); State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050,
license plate number of the front car in this
case.
15. The Defendant testified that he was at
least 85 to 95 feet or nine car lengths, behind
the vehicle immediately in front of his own.
The Court finds this testimony to be credible.
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded
that Trooper Mangelson rightfully determined
that the Defendant was "Following too Close"
or that any other attested facts preponderated
to the level necessary to permit a constitutional stop of the Defendant's vehicle. Moreover,
the Court finds that the Trooper's own testimony established the probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the alleged
violation was only a pretext asserted by the
Trooper to justify his stop of a vehicle with
out of state license plates and with occupants
of Latin origin.
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1056 (Utah 1987); State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Generally,
whether the requisite voluntariness exists
depends on "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of"
police conduct Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
226, 93 S.Ct at 2047; see also State v.
Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989).
2. Exploitation of primary illegality
A second factor is whether consent was
obtained through police exploitation of the
primary or antecedent police illegality. A
few courts have not accepted the second
factor. The Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct 315, 93
L.Ed.2d 289 (1986), focused exclusively on
the voluntariness of the consent in determining whether the taint of the prior police
illegality had been purged. The court stated:
We hold that voluntary consent, as defined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is
an intervening act free of police exploitation of the primary illegality and is sufficiently distinguishable from the primary
illegality to purge^ the evidence of the
primary taint
. . . The exploitation issue focuses solely on defendant's grant of consent, not
on the bare request, or the reasons underlying it While the police may exert
coercion in the manner in which they
request defendant's consent, the request
itself, even if motivated by the fruits of
the prior illegality, is not exploitation.
793 F.2d at 1147-49 (emphasis in original).
The Utah Court of Appeals followed this
approach in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972
(Utah Ct.App.1988). However, we disagree
with the rule established in Sierra because
it fails to give proper weight to Fourth
Amendment values, and we address the
issue of the propjerjstandard to be applied
in this jurisdiction under the second prong
of the analysis.
Professor LaFave has stated, "The apparent and unfortunate conclusion in Carson, therefore, is that exploitation can nev-

er occur in the sense of the illegal search
strongly influencing police in thereafter
seeking a particular consent, but only in
the sense of bringing added pressure to
bear upon the person from whom the consent is sought" 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 19-20 n. 88.1 (Supp.
1990). For example, under Carson, police
have power to conduct warrantless
searches without probable cause and then
use the fruits of illegal searches by obtaining a voluntary consent after the search
has already occurred. Police should not be
permitted to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after
the illegality has occurred.
Indeed, Carson seems to be antithetical
to the purpose of the exclusionary rule. In
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217,
80 S.Ct 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960),
the Supreme Court stated, "(The rule's]
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the
incentive to disregard it" A further purpose of the exclusionary rule implicated
here, as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1875. 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968), is to prevent making a court a
"party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions." Neither of these purposes is effectuated by ignoring police misconduct which is what the Carson approach encourages.
[9] The exclusionary rule protects not
only those accused of a crime but also
those whose only "crime" may be fitting a
"profile" which police use to determine
whom to search. In United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir.1987), the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The record does not reveal how many
unsuccessful searches Trooper Vogel has
conducted or how many innocent travelers the officer has detained. Common
sense suggests that those numbers may
be significant As well as protecting alleged criminals who are wrongfully
stopped or searched, the Fourth Amend-
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ment of the Constitution protects these
innocent citizens as well.
821 F.2d at 550.
The basis for the second part of the
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), which stated that
a trial court must determine in such a case
" 'whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint' " 371 U.S. at
488, 83 S.Ct. at 417 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to invalidate consents which, despite
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police illegality.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), is an example
of the application of the second part of the
two-part test In Royer, & suspect who
matched a drug courier profile was detained at an airport by two police officers
who requested and retained the suspect's
airline ticket and driver's license. The officers asked Royer to accompany them to a
room, later characterized as a "large storage closet," in the airport The officers
retrieved Royer's luggage from the airline
and obtained Royer's consent to open and
search the luggage. The search uncovered
narcotics. The trial court subsequently
found that Royer's consent was "freely and
voluntarily given" and therefore denied a
suppression motion. The Supreme Court
held that the detention of Royer constituted an illegal seizure. 460 U.S. at 507, 103
S.Ct at 1329. Without questioning the assertion that Royer's consent was "freely
4. In analyzing whether an exploitation of a primary illegality has occurred, nfcmy courts use
the criteria listed by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). See, e.g., State v. Cates, 202
Conn. 615, 621-23, 522 A.2d 788, 792-93 (1987);
People v. Odom, 83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 1028, 39
Ill.Dec. 406, 411, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980);
State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189, 191 (La.1978);
State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1077 (Me.
1982); People v. Borges, 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 1033,
517 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59-60

and voluntarily given," the plurality opinion concluded that "the consent was tainted
by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search." 460 U.S. at 507-08, 103
S.Ct. at 1329. Thus, the exploitation of the
illegality of the detention was the determinative factor, despite the voluntariness of
the consent.
Similarly, in People v. Odom, 83 111.
App.3d 1022, 39 Ill.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d
997 (1980), the court held that the defendant was illegally arrested by police who
lacked sufficient probable cause to effect
an arrest. The defendant had given officers consent to search a jacket in a vehicle.
The officers found drug paraphernalia.
The trial court held that "the items found
pursuant to ttfe search of [the] jacket were
not the fruit of [the] illegal arrest but
were, rather, obtained as a result of . . .
voluntary consent," which the trial court
stated was an "independent intervening"
factor. 83 IllvApp.3d at 1025, 39 Ill.Dec. at
409, 404 N.E.2d at 1000. The appellate
court agreed that the consent was voluntary but stated:
However, a finding that the defendant's consent to search was voluntarily
given is but one step-in the determination
of the propriety of the search,. because
even if the consent were voluntary it still
may have been obtained by the exploitation of an illegal arrest
Therefore,
the question before us is whether
Odom's consent was obtained by the exploitation of an illegal arrest, or "by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint"
83 Ill.App.3d at 1027-28, 39 Ill.Dec. at 411,
404 N.E.2d at 1002 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct 2254, 2259,
45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)).4 The court held
(1987); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414, 431
(Tex.Crim.App. 1987). Brown, concerned the
question of when a confession is the fruit of a
prior illegal arrest. The Court rejected a per se
rule that the giving of Miranda warnings is a
sufficient break in the chain of events between
the arrest and the confession. 422 U.S. at 603,
95 S.Ct. at 2261. In so doing, the Court stated
reasons which are also applicable to a consent
to search which is preceded by a police illegality:

that the consent had been tainted because
police illegally arrested the defendant at
gunpoint, even though there was no indication, he was armed and less than a minute
separated the arrest and the consent On
this basis, the court reversed the defendant's conviction.
Numerous other courts have adopted the
same basic analysis. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir.
1987); United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 1ZI F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984) ("In
addition to proving valid and voluntary consent to search, the Government must also
establish the existence of intervening
factors which prove that the consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
stop."); United States v. Thompson, 712
F.2d 1356, 1361 (11th Cir.1983) ("Because
[defendant] was illegally detained when he
gave his consent ... the district court's
conclusion that [the] consent was voluntary
is insufficient to validate the seizure and
search. [Defendant's] consent must also
be untainted by the illegal detention.");
United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601
(9th Cir.1981) ("[Evidence found as a result of ... consent must nonetheless be
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct
was not sufficiently attenuated from the
subsequent seizure
"); United States v.
Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir.), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct 622, 42
Thus, even if the statements in this case
were found to be voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements
made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong
Sun requires not merely that the statement
meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be "sufficiently an act of
free will to purge the primary taint." Wong
Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement's admissibility in light of the distinct
policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were
held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and
purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation,
the effect of the-exclusionary rule would be
substantially diluted. Arrests made without
warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or "investigation," would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived
therefrom could well be made admissible at

L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) (''[Information gained
by law enforcement officers during an illegal search cannot be used in a derivative
manner to obtain other evidence
");
State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621, 522
A.2d 788, 791 (1987) C[T]he mere fact a
consent to a search or a seizure is voluntary does not necessarily remove the taint
[of a prior illegality]." (Emphasis in original.)); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 297
(La.1985) ("When made after an illegal detention or search, consent to search, even if
voluntary, is valid only if it was the product of a free will and not the result of an
exploitation of the previous illegality.");
State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1077
(Me.1982) ("[T)he obvious connection between the invalid stop and the seizure of
[the evidence] has not been dissipated by
the defendant's consent to search
");
People v. Borges, 69 N.Y.2d 1031,1033, 517
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59 (1987)
("Although the voluntariness of the consent is an important factor in the court's
determination of attenuation, it is not dispositive...."); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d
414, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("The better
test is, of course, that evidence obtained by
the purported consent should not be held
admissible unless it is determined that the
consent was both voluntary and not an
exploitation of the prior illegality.").
trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid
Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings in effect, a
"cure-all,'' and the constitutional guarantee
against unlawful searches and seizures could
be said to be reduced to "a form of words."
422 VS. at 601-03, 95 S.Ct. at 2260-61 (citations
omitted). The Court concluded that Miranda
warnings were only one factor to be considered.
422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. The Court
listed "temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances [and] the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct" as relevant factors in such
cases. 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
Professor LaFave has stated that similar factors
are applicable to consent to search cases. 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94
(2d ed.1987). These factors should be considered in determining if there has been an
exploitation of the primary illegality in such
cases.
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In sum, we hold that the court of appeals' adoption of the Carson test in Sierra was erroneous.
IV. SCOPE OF CONSENT
[10] Finally, a search supported by voluntary consent which is not an exploitation
of the primary illegality may still be found
invalid if the search exceeds the scope of
the consent. Professor LaFave stated:
When the police are relying upon consent
as a basis for their warrantless search,
they have no more authority than they
have been given by the consent.
Assuming . . . that a general and unqualified consent was given, then the
boundaries of the place referred to mark
the outer physical limits of the authorized search. Even within those limits,
however, the police do not have carte
blanche to do whatever they please.
Certainly they may not engage in search
activity which involves the destruction of
property, and this would seem to bar
breaking into locked containers.
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c),
at 160-61 (2d ed.1987); see, e.g., State v.
Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 867 (Me.1974)
("[A] general consent to search ... would
not . . . sanction . . . the tearing down of
walls....").
Here, there is nothing in the record that
suggests what the limits of Trooper Mangelson's search were.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine the voluntariness of the consent, whether the consent was an exploitation of the illegal stop, and the scope of the
consent.
Reversed and remanded.
^
HOWE, Associate CJ., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result.
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valid and binding contract even though it
was never physically delivered to contractor; agreement bore all necessary signatures of state officials and clearly stated
that "signing this agreement settles any
and all claims on contract item [riprap]."
3. Judgment <3=>181(19)
Material fact issues existed as to
whether state highway department's chief
construction officer realized at time he
signed supplemental agreement intended to
compensate contractor for underrun of riprap that contract item pertaining to riprap
was related to unbalanced item for "clearing and grubbing," and thus whether signing amounted to unilateral mistake which
could serve as basis for reformation or
rescission, precluding summary judgment
for contractor on claim under agreement

July 23, 1990.

State highway contractor sought to enforce supplemental agreement purportedly
intended to compensate it for underrun of
riprap. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Richard H. Moffat, J., entered
judgment enforcing agreement, and state
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that: (1) supplemental agreement was
valid and binding contract, but (2) material
fact issues existed as to state's claim for
reformation or rescission based on unilateral mistake.
Reversed in part and remanded for
further proceedings.

1. Judgment <s=*181(2, 3]
Summary judgment is granted when
no genuine issue of material fact exists and
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; where there is material
issue of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate.
2. Highways <$=>113(3)
Supplemental agreement intended to
compensate state highway contractor for
underrun of riprap in excess of 25% was

R. Paul Van Dam, Donald S. Coleman,
and Leland D. Ford, Salt Lake City, for
Utah Dept of Transp.
Robert F. Babcock and Michael C. Van,
Salt Lake City, for B & A Associates.
Paul R. Howell, Clark B. Fetzer, and
Mark R. Madsen, Salt Lake City, and David
Hughes, Mission Viejo, Cal., for L.A.
Young Sons Const Co. and Reliance Ins.
Co.
HALL, Chief Justice:
This case involves only Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance) as appellee and
Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) as appellant and is on appeal from
a grant of a partial summary judgment in
favor of Reliance in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. The trial
court held that no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to a supplemental agreement between Reliance's assignor,
L.A. Young Sons Construction Company
(Young), and UDOT compensating Young
for fixed costs and overhead incurred by a
63.9 percent underrun on a UDOT project
FACTS
On April 23, 1985, UDOT began accepting bids on a project to reconstruct a por-

tion of Interstate 80 near Black Rock in
Tooele County, Utah (the project). On May
13, 1985, Young was awarded the bid and
contracted with UDOT to perform all construction work on the project for the approximate sum of $9,940,893.25.
Reliance furnished both payment and
performance bonds for Young on the
project. In addition, Young entered into
continuing agreements of indemnity with
Reliance pursuant to which Reliance is assigned any claims or causes of action
Young may have in connection with the
project.
Included in Young's bid was a cest estimate for the placement of 226,200* tons of
"riprap." Young initially subcontracted
the riprap work to B & A, which bid $5 per
ton to Young. Young in turn bid only $4
per ton on its master bid schedule. The bid
was based on a quantity estimate supplied
by UDOT engineers and relied upon by all
contractors who submitted bids.
Also included in Young's bid was a cost
estimate for "clearing and grubbing" that
was well in excess of UDOT's estimate.
While UDOT estimated $5,000 for clearing
and grubbing and the average bid submitted by contractors was $38,052, Young's
bid was $832,420. This inflated bid was
attributed to "unbalanced bidding," a practice whereby contractors attempt to mask
or hide their cost structure from competitors by overbidding some aspects of the
project and underbidding others. Unbalanced bidding is also utilized to attempt to
meet increased funding needs at particular
intervals in the project
Young was awarded the bid under condition that Young accept payment for the
clearing and grubbing in stages. After.
Young accepted this condition, UDOT
sought approval to award the unbalanced
contract from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), which administered the
federal highway funds used in the project.
FHWA raised some concerns about the
quantity of riprap specified by the UDOT
engineers, but after receiving verification
from UDOT's district director, FHWA concurred in the bid award to Young as proposed by UDOT.

